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The Mullins Hospital v. Squires' involved a novel applica-
tion of the common law defense of recoupment, as distin-
guished from set-off or counterclaim, in an action brought by
a governmental agency immune from liability for tort. The
hospital sued the administrator to recover for services ren-
dered decedent during her confinement for a considerable
period of time. The answer contained two defenses: (1) a
denial that defendant had sufficient knowledge or informa-
tion to form a belief as to plaintiff's corporate capacity and
a denial of the obligation, and (2) an affirmative defense
charging that decedent was injured soon after her admission
to the hospital and that plaintiff neglected to provide care
for her injury, thereby prolonging her hospitalization. Plain-
tiff demurred to the entire answer and in the alternative to
the affirmative defense upon the ground that neither stated
facts sufficient to constitute a defense for the reason that
there was in neither a sufficient denial of the allegation of
plaintiff's governmental status. Defendant thereupon moved.
for leave to file an amended answer and counterclaim so as
to plead an action in tort for decedent's injuries. The trial
judge overruled the demurrer and granted the motion.
Upon appeal the Supreme Court held that the demurrer was
properly overruled as to the first defense since the facts
alleged were sufficient to put in issue the question of defend-
ant's obligation to plaintiff for services rendered. As to the
allowance of the proposed counterclaim the Supreme Court
held that this was error in view of the well settled common law
exemption accorded governmental agencies in tort for the
negligence of their agents, which in this State is applicable
without regard to whether the services are governmental or
proprietary.
The Court considered, however, the novel question of
whether or not the negligence of a governmental agency may
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be pleaded by way of affirmative defense. The facts alleged
were construed as designed to diminish plaintiff's claim by
reason of its negligent failure to perform its contractual obli-
gations. This was recognized as the common law defense of re-
coupment which, as distinguished from a counterclaim, may
result only in reduction of plaintiff's claim and not in an af-
firmative money judgment; and unlike set-off, must grow out
of the same transaction which gave rise to plaintiff's cause of
action. The Court concluded that the rule of governmental im-
munity could not be invoked to bar this plea since the rule is
essentially defensive and was not intended to eliminate the de-
fendant's right to diminish the claim sued upon.
Election of Remedies
In White v. Livingston2 the doctrine of election of remedies
was successfully invoked to bar the plaintiff's claim. Action
was brought to have the deed from plaintiff to defendant de-
clared to be an equitable mortgage and for an accounting of
rents and profits. Defendant by answer plead as a bar the
judgment in a prior action between the parties, wherein plain-
tiff had sought unsuccessfully to have the sane deed set aside
upon the theory that its execution had been procured through
fraudulent representations that the instrument was a mort-
gage. Plaintiff's reply filed pursuant to order of the court
admitted the existence of the prior judgment and incorporated
the same.
Defendant moved for judgment on the pleadings, contend-
ing that plaintiff was estopped by reason of the former judg-
ment from relitigating the issue of the validity of the deed.
The trial judge construed the motion to be in the nature of a
general demurrer, and, applying the doctrine of election of
remedies, granted judgment for the defendant. His order,
affirmed and adopted as the judgment of the Supreme Court,
proceeded on the theory that one may not allege a certain
state of facts and invoke a certain remedy and later bring
an action alleging an entirely different and repugnant state
of facts, invoking a different remedy. This was distinguished
from the rule permitting the choice of a second remedy ap-
propriate to the same state of facts where the original remedy
is improper. The plaintiff, having claimed in the former ac-
tion that he was deceived into signing the deed, could not now
2. 234 S. C. 74, 106 S. E. 2d 892 (1959).
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proceed on the inconsistent theory of a violation by the de-
fendant of an agreement to reconvey, which would presume
that the deed was knowingly executed. The invocation of the
first remedy based upon a certain state of facts was an elec-
tion which barred the second remedy on an entirely different
set of facts.
Pleading Waiver
The question of pleading presented on appeal in Brown v.
State Farm Mutual Automobile Liability Insurance Company
8
was whether or not evidence was properly admitted tending
to show waiver by the insurance company of the policy re-
quirements respecting the giving of notice to the insurer of
the happening of an accident, in the absence of a plea of
waiver by plaintiff. Suit was brought to recover the amount
of a judgment obtained against the insured under a liability
policy issued by the defendant, the defense being that the in-
sured had failed to comply with policy requirements with
respect to the giving of notice and had failed to cooperate.
The trial court over objection admitted evidence tending to
show waiver of the policy conditions respecting written notice
of the accident and evidence of oral notice. The Supreme
Court held that the evidence was properly admitted under the
allegation that the insured "fully complied with and performed
all of the terms and conditions" in the policy. This was held
to be in accordance with the requirements of the CODE OF
LAws OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1952 § 10-673, which provides
that in pleading the performance of conditions precedent in
a contract it shall not be necessary to state the facts showing
such performance, but it may be stated generally that the
party duly performed all conditions on his part. The Court
noted that the answer set up affirmatively the failure to give
written notice and the defendant could have required plaintiff
to reply thereto had it so desired under pertinent sections
of the Code.4 Since plaintiff could not reply as a matter of
right under applicable provisions of the Code, the new matter
would be deemed controverted.5
3. 233 S. 0. 376, 104 S. E. 2d 673 (1958).
4. CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1952 § 10-661.
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Judgment on the Pleadings
The appeal in United States Casualty Company v. Tiers,
et al.0 was from the order of the trial judge granting judg-
ment on the pleadings in favor of plaintiff. The complaint
alleged that defendants, as insurance agents, had failed
through their negligence to refund to the insured the premium
paid upon a certain policy issued by plaintiff and thereby
effect the cancellation of said policy, as a result of which
plaintiff was required to pay a judgment obtained against it
under the terms of the policy, including costs and expenses.
Defendants in their answer denied negligence resulting in loss,
alleged that the loss sustained was due to plaintiff's wrongful
cancellation and further plead as a defense the sole negligence
and contributory negligence of plaintiff in wrongfully can-
celling the policy. The order of the trial judge was affirmed
on appeal under the authority of the pertinent Code sections
permitting the striking out of answers and defenses that are
sham and irrelevant 7 and frivolous." The Court's review of
the facts indicated that all of the relevant facts, including the
agents' collection of the premium and failure to refund the
same upon request, had been established in the former action
and no issues of fact were raised by the answer.
Payment
Crane Company v. Continental Casualty Company9 was an
action against the surety on a contractor's bond, seeking pay-
ment for materials and equipment allegedly furnished to a
subcontractor and used in the erection of the project covered
in the contract. From an adverse judgment defendant ap-
pealed, alleging error in the refusal of the trial judge to
'submit to the jury the issue of payment. The allegation in
the complaint of non-payment was denied by a general denial
in the answer. The Supreme Court held that the question
of whether or not plaintiff's allegation of non-payment was
put in issue by defendant's denial need not be decided, since
the plaintiff's testimony of non-payment was uncontradicted
and no evidence of payment was offered by defendant.
6. 233 S. C. 333, 104 S. E. 2d 561 (1958).
7. CODD OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1952 § 10-654.
8. CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1952 § 10-1505.
9. 234 S. C. 44, 106 S. E. 2d 674 (1959).
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Motion to Strike
Blackmon v. United Insurance Company 0 involved an ap-
peal from the order of the trial judge refusing to strike alle-
gations of the complaint for the recovery of punitive damages
and construing the complaint as setting forth a cause of
action for fraudulent breach of contract accompanied by a
fraudulent act. The pertinent allegations were that defend-
ant's agents had represented to plaintiff that if she would
surrender the policy, receipt books and other documents, she
would be paid the face amount of the policy as beneficiary;
that she did so, relying upon said representations, and de-
fendant fraudulently retained them and refused to pay the
proceeds of the policy. The Supreme Court held that the trial
judge correctly construed the action as one for fraudulent
breach of contract, accompanied by a fraudulent act and that
the retention of the policy and receipt book obtained from
the beneficiary by fraudulent representations was a fraudu-
lent act within the meaning of the rule. The allegations ap-
propriate to recovery of punitive damages were properly
stated and the trial judge was correct in refusing the motion
to strike. The Court noted that refusal of such a motion is
not appealable under settled authority.1 1
Set-Off and Counterclaim
In Brock v. Mason, et al.'2 the Supreme Court affirmed the
order of the trial judge sustaining plaintiff's demurrer to
the defense of set-off as alleged in the answer. It appeared
that plaintiff was a subcontractor on a school project in'
Cherokee County and brought action against the general
contractors and their surety to recover for work alleged to
have been done. The surety pleaded by way of defense and
set-off a claim arising out of the construction of a bank build-
ing in Spartanburg in which the principals were the same.
The Court found that at the time of the commencement of the
suit, no action had accrued to the surety on the former project,
since the ultimate amount of its liability had not been estab-
lished. The attempted set-off, not being such that the surety
10. 233 S. C. 424,105S. E. 2d 521 (1958).
11. Sparks v. Dew, 230 S. C. 507, 96 S. E. 2d 488 (1957); Winchester
v. United Insurance Co., 231 S. C. 288, 98 S. E. 2d 530 (1957).
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could maintain a separate action therefor, was held properly
subject to demurrer.
Illegitimacy
Sanders v. Sanders3 involved an appeal by a mother from
the order of the circuit judge awarding the custody of minor
children equally to both parents, after adjudging the marriage
to be null and void by reason of the invalidity of a divorce
decree dissolving the wife's former marriage. The mother
contended that the trial court should have adjudged the chil-
dren born of the later marriage to be illegitimate, thereby
barring the husband from any right to their custody. This
contention was disposed of adversely to appellant by the
Court's conclusion that the issue of legitimacy was not raised
under the pleadings since illegitimacy was not alleged in
either the complaint or the answer and the allegation of
legitimacy by virtue of the CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CARO-
LINA, 1952 § 20-6.1 was a mere conclusion of the pleader; and
that the determination of the question was not essential to
the trial court's disposition of the issue of custody. The Court
noted that an adjudication of legitimacy vel non would have
been improper because the pleadings raised no issue there-
about; and unnecessary, since the welfare of the children
was the primary concern of the court.
Demurrer
Timmons v. The News and Press, Inc.14 was an action for
libel wherein the trial court sustained a demurrer to the com-
plaint on the ground that the newspaper article complained
of was not libelous per se nor was it so by innuendo. In re-
versing, the Supreme Court applied the established rule that
the allegations of the complaint must be taken as true for the
purpose of consideration of a demurrer on the ground that it
does not state a cause of action. The Court recognized that
words not actionable by their plain meaning cannot be made
so by innuendo, but where words used are capable of different
meanings the jury must ascertain the sense in which they
were published and decide which meaning was conveyed to the
readers. The facts alleged in the complaint were held to state
a proper cause of action within the purview of the rule.
13. 232 S. C. 625, 103 S. E. 2d 281 (1958).
14. 232 S. C. 639, 103 S. E. 2d 277 (1958).
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In Thomason v. Helhams'5 action was brought to construe
a will, under the terms of which the testator devised all of his
real estate to his wife for her life but empowered her to sell
the same if it became necessary for her support and comfort;
and provided that the remainder at her death would go to his
nephew. In his complaint the nephew sought' to impress the
proceeds with a trust in his favor and asked that he be al-
lowed the opportunity to purchase the property at a price
for which she agreed to sell to others. The trial court's sus-
tention of a demurrer to the complaint was affirmed on ap-
peal, the Court noting that the facts alleged in the complaint
must be taken as true on demurrer. The Court concluded
that the plaintiff's prayer that the proceeds of sale be kept
apart, the remainder to become his property, was prema-
ture, there having been no sale and no proceeds; and his
prayer to enjoin the sale if he were not given opportunity
to purchase was unsupported by authority and contrary to the
terms of the will, which attached no such condition to the
wife's power of sale.
Stewart v. Martin, et al.16 involved a novel action growing
out of an automobile collision. The complaint alleged that the
defendants wrongfully and maliciously removed and secreted
the damage feasant vehicle, as a result of which the Sheriff
was unable to attach the same, with resulting damages to
plaintiff. Demurrer was interposed on the ground that the
complaint failed to state a cause of action since it did not ap-
pear that there had been any adjudication that the alleged
damages to the plaintiff's automobile were caused by the negli-
gent operation of the hidden vehicle. The circuit judge con-
strued the complaint as an action for conversion and sustained
the demurrer on the theory that such an action could not be
maintained until the plaintiff's lien was judicially determined.
In reversing, the Supreme Court reiterated the rule that in
passing on a demurrer, the allegations of the complaint must
be construed as true. The Court held that the action could
be properly maintained on the theory upon which it was
brought, noting that this form of action was entirely distinct
from an action for damages against the offending automo-
bile and was not dependent upon obtaining a prior judgment
15. 239 S. C. 11, 103 S. E. 2d 324 (1958).
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In Alderman v. Biven, et al.17 action was brought to re-
scind a release signed by plaintiff for damages to his truck on
the theory that it had been executed under a mutual mistake of
fact, and to recover additional damages alleged to have been
sustained. The complaint stated that plaintiff had accepted the
sum of Thirty Five ($35.00) Dollars in settlement of damages
to the engine of his truck which were due to defendants' fail-
ure to provide anti-freeze, and had executed a release of all
claims based upon the representation of a garage man that
this was the extent of the damages. This it was alleged had
been done under a "mutual mistake" of fact. Defendants' de-
murrer was sustained by the trial judge on the ground that
the allegations of mutual mistake of fact were merely conclus-
ions of fact not admitted by demurrer and that the facts al-
leged showed that the mistake was unilateral on the part of
the plaintiff. In affirming, the Supreme Court reiterated the
established rule that a demurrer admits the facts alleged in
the complaint but does not admit the inferences drawn by
plaintiff from such facts; and that the allegation of a "mu-
tual mistake" of fact constituted only a conclusion not admit-
ted by demurrer. The Court concluded from the facts alleged
that the mistake was unilateral only since it resulted from the
failure of the plaintiff's own agent to discover the full ex-
tent of the damages to the truck. In the absence of any charge
that the release was obtained by fraud, deceit, misrepresen-
tation or imposition in any form, the facts alleged were held
insufficient to state a cause of action for rescission.
In Turbeville v. Gordon, et al.18 the plaintiff sought to hold
the defendant as well as "all persons unknown claiming an in-
terest in the premises" personally liable for the balance due on
the construction of a house on land owned by the defendant.
The pertinent facts alleged were that the house had been con-
structed at the instance of defendant's daughter and son-in-
law and that she had agreed to execute a note and mortgage
to secure the payment of the balance due, which was, however,
to be paid by her daughter and son-in-law, and that they had
subsequently refused to do so. The daughter vacated the pre-
mises after her husband's death and the property was there-
after rented by defendant. The trial court sustained the de-
murrer interposed on behalf of the unknown heirs but held
17. 233 S. 0. 545, 106 S. E. 2d 385 (1958).
18. 233 S. C. 75, 103 S. E. 2d 521 (1958).
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that the complaint stated a good cause of action against the
mother. In seeking to reverse, she argued that she had made
no contract with plaintiff nor authorized construction of the
house and that the complaint clearly showed that the house
was constructed at the instance of the daughter and son-in-
law, who would pay for the same. The Supreme Court applied
the well settled rule that a complaint is not demurrable if it
contains allegations entitling the plaintiff to any form of re-
lief, and that such allegations, together with relevant infer-
ences reasonably deducible therefrom, are to be liberally con-
strued in plaintiff's favor. Although recognizing that the com-
plaint was vague and indefinite, yet when liberally construed
the Court held that it stated a good cause of action against de-
fendant. The fact that plaintiff had insisted that ownership
be vested in defendant, that she had agreed to execute a note
and mortgage, and other surrounding circumstances were held
to afford a basis for estoppel to deny liability and to charge
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